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We develop a theoretical framework to study the impact of the exchange rate 
regime in the interest rate determination. Using VECM, we assess the role of both 
domestic conditions and US factors in the determination of eight Latin-American 
countries’ interest rates between February 1998 and April 2009. Three countries 
have hard-peg while the remaining five follow alternative regimes. The long and 
short-run determinants of domestic rates as well as an impulse response analysis 
prove that economies with rigidly-fixed exchange rates do not bear a loss of 
monetary autonomy substantially higher than that of floating-rate economies, 
with the exception of Brazil. 
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1.  Introduction
Choosing an exchange rate regime is a fundamental macroeconomic 
policy decision, especially for small open economies. The choice to adopt 
fixed exchange rates or not, may determine policy options and/or the ability 
to maintain open capital markets. In this paper, we test a basic proposition 
of international macroeconomics, the notion of the open-economy trilemma 
(Mundell, 1963), which implies that countries cannot have fixed exchange rates, 
domestic monetary autonomy, and open capital markets all at once, but can only 
pursue two of these options. 
We can explain the behavior of short-term interest rates with two different 
approaches (Barassi et al, 2005). Interest rates can either be treated as analogous 
to other asset prices, in which case their movements are interpreted as being 92 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
determined by financial flows in profit-seeking capital markets, giving rise to a set 
of arbitrage conditions such as uncovered interest parity. Or they can be viewed 
as policy instruments and are then determined by decisions aiming at a policy 
objective such as an exchange rate or an inflation target. There is a long standing 
literature on the latter (Clarida et al., 1998; 1999; 2001; Adam et al., 2005). In 
this paper, our objective is different as we study the interest rate behavior in the 
long run, taking into account both internal and external determinants and making 
a systematic link with exchange rate policy. 
Although monetary independence has been at the heart of the debate on 
exchange rate regimes, empirical evidence on this issue is still mixed. Shambaugh 
(200) uses a sample of 100 industrialized and developing countries from 1973 to 
2000 and finds that fixed countries’ interest rates strongly follow the base country 
interest rate changes. Obstfeld et al. (200; 2005) also find that the interest rates of 
floating-rate economies show far less connection to the base country’s interest rates 
than hard-peg countries. Borensztein et al. (2001) also report evidence consistent 
with the traditional view of more monetary independence for flexible-rate countries. 
On the opposite, some papers find evidence consistent with the alternative view, 
namely, the more firmly pegged is a country to the dollar, the smaller its reaction 
to changes in US interest rates. This is the case of Frankel (1999) who studies 
the effects of nominal interest rate fluctuations in the United States on domestic 
rates in Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico and Panama between 1993 and 
1998 and finds that this effect is significantly larger in economies with no credible 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate parity (Brazil and Mexico) than in countries 
with « truly fixed » regimes (Argentina, Hong Kong and Panama). Hausmann et 
al. (1999) use a monthly panel of 11 Latin American countries between 1960 and 
1998 and conduct a similar exercise. They conclude that the effect of US interest 
rate on domestic rates is 25% lower in fixed-exchange-rates countries. 
The “fear of floating” literature, initiated by Calvo and Reinhardt (2002), 
states that only large countries can benefit, or choose to benefit, from an independent 
monetary policy, as many declared floating-rate countries de facto limit exchange 
rate flexibility and may not have or use the autonomy attributed to floating rates. 
For Frankel et al. (2002), fixing the exchange rate does not generate a loss of 
monetary flexibility, as most countries would not have freedom even if they had 
floating rates. This is in line with the growing body of literature that states that 
emerging markets economies, prone to important changes in international investors’ 
confidence, cannot benefit from the use of the interest rate instrument and that 
would actually be worse to let them that possibility. The question we pose here is 
whether the exchange rate regime influences the extent to which domestic short 
term interest rates are caused by internal and/or external factors.
This paper is an extension of the existing literature in that we not only 
look at relationships between domestic and base country’s interest rates but we 
allow for a set of both internal and external factors as possible determinants of 
local interest rates in the long and short run while making a systematic link with 
the exchange rate regime. By external factors, we refer to US variables, as we are 
looking at Latin American countries. We develop a revised version of Frankel’s Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 93
(1979) model to take into account emerging countries’ specificities. Namely, we 
allow for imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets. The long-run 
history of sovereign debt in Latin America indicates that bonds are frequently 
traded at market values showing substantial levels of risk premium. We also model 
currency substitution in the domestic money demand specification as it is a very 
significant phenomenon in Latin America. 
Using vector error correction models, we assess empirically the role of both 
domestic conditions and US factors in the determination of eight Latin American 
countries’ interest rates, with monthly data over February 1998 through April 2009. 
Three are hard-peg countries, the remaining five have flexible or intermediate 
exchange rate regimes as calculated with our update of the Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) de facto classification method, based on data on exchange 
rates and reserves. The long and short-run determinants of domestic interest rates 
as well as an analysis of impulse response functions prove that economies with 
rigidly-fixed exchange rates do not bear a loss of monetary autonomy substantially 
higher than that of floating-rate economies, with the exception of Brazil, the 
region’s largest country and the only floating-rate-economy of our sample that 
proves to benefit from monetary freedom. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
brief description of the macroeconomic framework, Section 3 describes the data 
and econometric model, Section  presents the results and finally in Section 5 
we conclude.
2.  Conceptual Framework
Based on Frankel’s (1979) model, we develop a simple macroeconomic 
framework to study interest rate determination. Our first assumption is an interest 
rates parity condition distorted by a risk premium as we are considering emerging 
market economies: 
(1)  it = it
*+ xt + rt
where it is the domestic nominal interest rate; it
* is the foreign nominal interest 
rate; xt is the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency quoted as 
the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency; and rt is a 
time-varying risk premium. 
Note that in equation (1) we do not assume efficient markets in which 
sovereign bonds would be perfect substitutes. The long-run history of sovereign 
debt in Latin America indicates that bonds are frequently traded at market values 
showing substantial levels of risk premium. The empirical literature (Alper et al., 
2007) on the uncovered interest parity condition reveals that emerging countries 
deserve a special treatment due to specific macroeconomic conditions including 
incomplete institutional reforms, weaker macroeconomic fundamentals, and 
shallow financial markets. 9 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
As in Dornbusch’s (1976) model, we distinguish between the long-run 
exchange rate, to which the economy will ultimately converge, and the current 
exchange rate. Denoting the logarithms of the current and long-run exchange rates 
by et and e, respectively, we assume that:
(2)  x e e t t = − ( ) θ
Equation (2) states that the expected rate of depreciation of the spot rate 
is proportional to the discrepancy between the long-run rate and the current spot 
rate. The long-run exchange rate is assumed known, and an expression for it will 
be developed below. We assume purchasing power parity holds in the long run:
(3)   e p p = −
*
where p and p
* are defined as the logarithms of the equilibrium price levels at 
home and abroad, respectively. 
We assume a domestic money demand specification that takes into account 
the most significant phenomenon in Latin America, namely currency substitution. 
Based on the long standing literature on currency substitution (Miles, 1978; Arize, 
199; de Freitas and Veiga, 2006), we consider that the conventional money demand 
equation must be augmented with the exchange rate:
()  m p y i e t t t t t = + − − ϕ λ ψ      
where mt, pt and yt are defined as the logarithms of the nominal quantity of money, 
the price level and the real income respectively. A conventional money demand 
function holds abroad:
(5)  m p y i t t t t
* * * * = + − δ λ    
As in Frankel’s model, we assume that the interest rate semi-elasticities of 
money demands are the same for the domestic and foreign countries. Let us take 
the difference between the two equations () and (5): 
(6)  m m p p y y i i e t t t t t t t t t − = − + − − − −
* * * * ( ) ϕ δ λ ψ          
Using bars to denote equilibrium values, and remembering that in the long 
run, when e e i i = − = ,
* r, we obtain:
(7)  e m m y y =
−
− − + +


   







Substituting (7) into (1), and assuming, as in Frankel’s (1979) model, 
that the current equilibrium money supplies, income levels and risk premium are Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 95
given by their current actual levels, we obtain a complete equation of interest 
rate determination:
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we obtain:
(9)  i i e m m y y t t t t t t t t = + − −


   


   + − +
* * * θ α β ζ γr
The domestic interest rate is positively related to the foreign interest rate, 
the exchange rate, the external money supply, the domestic level of income and 
the risk premium and negatively related to the domestic money supply and the 
foreign level of income. This relation is tested empirically for a set of eight Latin 
American countries.
3.  Data and Econometric Methodology
The monthly data set runs from February 1998 to April 2009. We study 
the eight Latin American countries for which the JP Morgan Emerging Market 
Bond Index plus (EMBI+) spread is reported, namely Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The EMBI+ is a US dollar emerging 
markets debt benchmark while the EMBI+ spread, commonly known as sovereign 
spread, measures the credit risk premium over US Treasury bonds. 
Within these countries, we have three hard-peg experiences: Panama on 
the whole sample, Ecuador as of January 2000 and Argentina between January 
1998 and December 2001. The remaining five countries follow either flexible or 
intermediate exchange rate regimes as calculated with our update of the Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005) de facto classification method. They are used as control 
countries. We also look at the case of Argentina restricted to the floating period as 
a sixth experience of control country. Our sample excludes hyperinflation periods 
which increase the probability that the domestic and the US time series have the 
same integration properties. The EMBI data has been obtained from JP Morgan 
and stands for the risk premium. As a proxy to measure monetary policy, we use 
a short-term interest-rate, the 90-day interbank market rate when available or the 
deposit 90-180 day rate as an alternative. Data has mainly been extracted from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). We use the nominal exchange 
rate (expressed as national currency per US dollars), a M1 index, the consumer 
price index and an industrial production index. More details on the data used and 
samples are given in the Appendix, Table A1.96 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
We estimate our model of interest rate determination for each country. We 
first check the order of integration of the data using ADF1, Phillips-Perron (1988), 
KPSS2 and Ng-Perron (2001) unit root tests. All series are integrated of order one, 
results of these tests are presented in the Appendix, Table A2. We then conduct the 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration procedure to test 
for the presence of cointegrating vectors between the domestic interest rate, a set 
of internal variables and a set of external variables. The procedure is based on the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the vector error correction model (VECM):
(10)  ∆zt = Π zt−1 + Γ1 ∆zt−1 + …. + Γp−1 ∆zt−p+1 + κ + ut
where the matrix Γ captures the short-run aspects of the relationships between 
the elements of zt and the matrix Π reflects the long-run information. The rank of 
Π, denoted by r, determines the number of cointegrating relations. The matrix Π 
can be decomposed into two matrices, α and β where Π = αβ’. The weights, also 
called the error coefficients, are contained in matrix α that forces the series back 
towards their underlying equilibrium relations while the cointegrating vectors are 
contained in matrix β that gives the underlying long-term relations.
According to our theoretical framework, we have zt = [it, it
US, rt, et, yt, 
yt
US, mt, mt
US], Π and Γ1, Γ2,.., Γp-1 are (8×8) matrices of parameters, κ is a 
(8×1) vector of parameters and ut is a (8×1) vector of white noise errors. To 
determine the number of cointegrating vectors in zt, we look at both maximum 
eigenvalue and trace tests. In case they don’t lead to the same conclusion, we 
rely on the maximum eigenvalue test as, in comparison, the trace test may lack 
power (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). We test for possible instability in the long-
term relations using a stability analysis of the recursive eigenvalues (Hansen and 
Johansen, 1999). As in Barassi et al. (2005), we estimate time-varying adjustment 
coefficients using unobserved components models. As the different specification 
tests for α—AR(1), random walk with or without drift—result unsuccessful, we 
conclude that coefficients α are stable and that there is no structural breaks in 
the causal linkages that generate the cointegrating relations between the series. 
We check and validate the hypotheses on residuals, namely, no-serial correlation 
with the Ljung-Box statistic and normality of the distribution with the Jarque-
Bera statistic. 
To investigate more precisely the relations between the variables of each 
country’s VECM, we use an impulse response analysis. The impulse response 
function traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current 
and future values of the endogenous variables. However if the components of ut 
are contemporaneously correlated, and hence Σu is not diagonal, the shocks are 
not likely to occur in isolation in practice and impulse responses may not reflect 
the actual reactions of a given system properly. As explained by Lütkepohl 
(2007), orthogonalized shocks are often considered in impulse response analysis. 
1  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981).
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Any nonsingular matrix P with the property that PP’ = Σu can be used to define 
orthogonalized shocks as ηt = P-1ut where ηt are the structural shocks of the model 
and are contemporaneously uncorrelated. However if the residuals correlation matrix 
is diagonal, then the reduced-form model is identical to its structural form. As the 
matrix P is not unique, we have to impose restrictions on P, based on economic 
theory, which result in unique impulse responses. A popular choice of P is a lower 
triangular matrix obtained by a Choleski decomposition of Σu. For each country 
studied, we start by looking at the residuals correlation matrix and in case it is not 
diagonal, we check whether an alternative ordering of the variables would lead 
to modified responses. Impulse response functions are displayed as graphs. We 
consider one-standard-deviation shocks and look at the effects of the shocks on a 
2 months period. Each impulse response goes with a 95% confidence band. 
.  Empirical Results
The results of the Johansen cointegration tests as well as the set of linear 
restrictions on both α and β coefficients are presented in the Appendix, Table A3. 
The weak exogeneity tests enable us to determine, for each country, whether 
the domestic interest rate is the dependent variable in one of the cointegrating 
vectors3. We have introduced dummy variables where necessary to account for 
outliers. These control variables are detailed in the Appendix, Table A. We do 
find cointegrating relations with the domestic interest rate being driven by some 
of the system variables in all eight countries. We concentrate on these interest rate 
equations. In the following section we present the long and short-run dynamics 
of the hard-peg countries’ domestic interest rates while the other one discusses 
those of control countries. 
.1  Hard-peg countries
Before proceeding to a detailed description of the econometric results, we 
include in Table 1, a summary of the results for the hard-peg countries. This table 
presents the long and short-run determinants of domestic interest rates as well as 
the impulse variables that prove to induce significant interest rate responses.
In all three countries, we find out that not only US variables but also internal 
variables play a role in the interest rate determination in the long and short run. 
However when analyzing impulse responses, it appears that the domestic interest 
rates of both dollarized countries are only influenced by US variables, namely the 
US interest rate and the US money supply. On the contrary, in the case of Argentina 
restricted to the currency board period, the only impulse variable that has an impact 
on local interest rates is the domestic money supply. We are tempted to interpret 
3  Lag order selection criteria, recursive-eigenvalue stability tests and residual tests are not presented 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 99
this as being due to the difference between a dollarization exchange rate regime 
and a currency-board regime, however results for Argentina have to be taken with 
caution as the sample is very short. Hard-peg countries’ interest rates are mostly 
influenced by US variables however not exclusively!
We below proceed to a detailed analysis of the econometric results. The 
long-run determinants of domestic interest rates in Panama as well as in Ecuador 
and Argentina restricted to their hard-peg period are presented in Table 2. 
 The long-run equations are all stable during the observation period. As 
expected, in the long run, we observe a positive impact of US interest rates on both 
dollarized countries’ interest rates, but we also notice the influence of domestic 
fundamentals! The monetary policy of both countries is not solely caused by 
US variables but is also oriented towards internal goals. We observe a positive 
influence of the domestic level of activity in the long-run equation of Panama’s 
interest rates. An increase in income raises the demand for money compared to 
the supply, generating an increase in the nominal interest rate. We also notice a 
negative impact of the domestic money supply on Ecuador and Argentina’s interest 
rates. When there is a contraction of money supply relative to money demand, 
without a matching fall in prices, the domestic interest rate rises. In terms of 
foreign influence, we observe a negative impact of the US level of income on both 
countries’ rates, as expected theoretically. Finally, there is a negative influence 
of the US money supply on Panamanian and Ecuadorian interest rates, which is 
opposite to the sign given by the conceptual framework and may be due to full 
dollarization in both countries. Our interpretation of this result is that a rise in US 
money supply leads to a decline in the US interest rate which directly spills-over 
to both dollarized countries’ domestic interest rates. The case of Argentina during 
the currency board has to be interpreted with caution as the sample is very short. 
Table 3 presents the determinants of domestic interest rate changes.
  Restricted to the currency-board period.
TABLE 3
THE SHORT-RUN DETERMINANTS 
OF THE DOMESTIC INTEREST RATE DYNAMICS ∆it
Panama ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ i i y m t t t
US
t
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Source: Own estimation.
Notes: Values in parentheses are t-statistics; εt captures the errors of the cointegrating relationship 
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Hard-peg-countries’ interest rate changes are determined by changes in both 
US and internal variables as well as by an error correction term. Changes in the risk 
premium are statistically significant in explaining changes in both Ecuadorian and 
Argentinian5 interest rates. The VECM’s short-term dynamics show that domestic 
interest rates are equilibrium-correcting. The adjustment coefficients range from 
3% in the case of Panama to 1% for Ecuador and 8% in the case of Argentina. 
We also compute half-life6 coefficients, namely, the required time for the interest 
rates to adjust back towards their equilibrium level by 50%. It takes 16 months 
for the deviation of Panamanian interest rates from their long-run value to fall 
by half, 2.6 months in the case of Ecuadorian interest rates, while it only takes 
1.5 month for Argentinian rates. However this last case has to be interpreted with 
caution as the sample is substantially smaller. 
Once observed the long and short-run determinants of hard-peg countries’ 
domestic interest rates, we model shocks on the variables intervening in the long-
term relations to find out the ones having a significant impact on interest rates. 
Impulse response functions measure the effect of a one-standard-deviation change 
in one of the system variables on the domestic interest rate. Table  presents the 
residuals correlation matrices. 
Looking at these matrices, we check whether the shocks are likely to 
occur in isolation in practice and whether impulse responses may reflect the 
actual reactions of the given system properly. In the case of Panama, correlations 
between residuals are rather small with the exception of the one between domestic 
and US interest rates, while in the case of Ecuador we have relatively strong 
correlations between the US level of income and the US money supply and also 
between domestic and US money supplies. We model impulse responses with 
an alternative ordering of the variables when the ordering has an impact on 
responses. Finally, in the case of Argentina there is a 50% residuals correlation 
between the domestic interest rate and the domestic money supply and an also 
substantially high correlation between the domestic money supply and the US 
level of income. Figures 1 to 3 present the effect of successive shocks on the 
domestic interest rates in Panama, Ecuador and Argentina. The impulse responses 
are presented with a 95% confidence band. 
In Panama, as presented in Figure 1, we first model a restrictive US 
monetary policy shock. It leads to a positive and significant response of 
the Panamanian interest rate on the entire period while a domestic demand 
shock has no effect at all. Finally a positive shock on the US money supply 
leads to a positive effect on the domestic interest rate, significant on the 2 
months, which is in line with the conceptual framework but is opposite to the 
long-term relation we have between the local interest rate and the US money 
supply. However when we look at the short-run dynamics of the Panamanian 
interest rate, we effectively have a positive relation between changes in the 
5  Restricted to the currency-board period.
6  The half-life coefficient is defined as HL = ln(0.5)/ln(m) with εt = mεt−1 + Σj
k
=1 τj−1∆εt−j + ηt 
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FIGURE 1
PANAMANIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES
TO A SHOCK ON US INTEREST RATE, ON DOMESTIC INCOME
AND ON US MONEY SUPPLY
Source: Own estimation.Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 103
domestic interest rate and changes in the US money supply. The modeling of 
an alternative variables ordering has only a minor impact on the effect of the 
US money supply shock on domestic interest rates. Indeed the impact stays 
positive and significant, however just on the first part of the observation period 
and not any more on the 2 months. 
FIGURE 2
ECUADORIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES
TO A SHOCK ON US INTEREST RATE, ON US INCOME AND
 ON DOMESTIC AND US MONEY SUPPLIES
Source: Own estimation.
In the case of Ecuador, as reported in Figure 2, we also first model 
a restrictive US monetary policy shock that leads to a positive response of 
the domestic interest rate, significant as of the fourth month and on the rest 
of the period, while an external demand shock and a domestic monetary 
shock have almost no impact at all on Ecuadorian interest rates. Finally, as 
in Panama, a positive shock on the US money supply leads to a positive and 
significant effect on the domestic interest rate, in line with the conceptual 
framework but opposite to the long-run relation estimated. When we model an 
alternative ordering of the variables, we obtain domestic interest rate responses 
substantially different. As presented in Figure A1, in Appendix, an expansive 10 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
domestic monetary shock, when happening first, leads to a small increase of 
the domestic interest rate, a US monetary shock has almost no effect, while a 
positive external demand shock, with this alternative ordering of the variables, 
has a positive and significant impact on the Ecuadorian interest rate. 
 Finally, Figure 3 traces the effects of an external demand shock and a 
domestic monetary shock on the Argentinian interest rate, on the hard-peg period. 
The external demand shock has almost no significant impact on the domestic 
interest rate while, as expected theoretically, an expansive domestic monetary 
shock leads to a decline of the Argentinian interest rate, significant on the 2 
months. The modeling of an alternative ordering of the variables doesn’t make 
any difference on the domestic interest rate responses.
FIGURE 3
ARGENTINIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON US INCOME AND ON DOMESTIC MONEY SUPPLY
Source: Own estimation.
The presence of domestic income in the long-run equation of Panamanian 
interest rates, of domestic money supply in the long-run equation of Ecuadorian 
interest rates as well as the presence of the risk premium in the latter’ interest 
rates short-run dynamics prove that both dollarized countries’ interest rates are not 
solely determined by US variables. However when analyzing impulse responses, 
it appears that domestic interest rates are exclusively influenced by US variables, 
namely the US interest rate and the US money supply in both dollarized countries. 
In the two countries, the fact that internal variables play a role in the interest rate 
determination in the long and short run make us conclude that their interest rates, 
even if mostly influenced by US variables as shown in the impulse responses 
analysis, are not exclusively caused by them! Argentina’s interest rate equilibrium 
relation includes the US level of income as well as the domestic money supply. 
However when simulating shocks on both variables, it appears that the domestic 
interest rate only respond to a shock on the domestic variable. We are tempted 
to interpret the difference between these three countries as being caused by the Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 105
exchange rate regime, namely dollarization regime and currency-board regime, 
however results for Argentina have to be taken with caution as the sample is very 
short. In the next section, we look at the behavior of short-term interest rates in 
the floating-exchange-rate countries.
.2   Control countries
As in the previous section, we include in Table 5, an overview of the 
results for the control countries, before proceeding to a detailed description of 
the econometric results. With the exception of Brazil, we observe an impact of 
both domestic and US variables in the determination of the control-countries’ 
domestic interest rates looking at the long and short-run dynamics as well 
as looking at the impulse response functions. Domestic interest rates are not 
independent from what is happening in the United States as they are caused by 
both internal and US factors.
We below proceed to a detailed description of the econometric results of 
the control-countries’ domestic interest rates. The long-run determinants of the 
local interest rates of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Argentina 
restricted to the floating period, are presented in Table 6. The equilibrium 
equations are all stable on the observation period with the exception of Brazil 
at the end of 1998, beginning of 1999, corresponding to the deep financial crisis 
the country went through. We observe a foreign influence on local interest rates 
in the long run meaning that the monetary policy of control countries does not 
seem to exclusively pursue domestic aims. Mexican, Peruvian and Venezuelan 
rates all positively depend on US interest rates. There is also a positive influence 
of the exchange rate on Venezuelan and Argentinian rates, which turns negative 
in the case of Colombian rates. According to our theoretical framework, an 
exchange rate depreciation causes a rise in the domestic nominal interest rate 
as stated in the uncovered interest parity condition. However, according to the 
currency-substitution phenomenon, an exchange rate depreciation generates a 
fall in money demand relative to money supply, leading to a temporary decline 
in the domestic interest rate.
In terms of foreign influence, we also observe a negative impact of the 
US level of activity on Peruvian and Venezuelan rates and a positive influence of 
US money supply on Mexican rates. An expansion in the foreign money supply 
implies a depreciation of the exchange rate and then supposedly an increase of 
the domestic nominal interest rate. We also notice in each cointegrating equation 
the presence of internal factors. Namely, we observe a positive influence of the 
domestic level of activity for Brazilian, Mexican and Argentinian rates, as an 
increase in income raises the demand for money that generates an increase in 
the nominal interest rate. There is a negative influence of the domestic money 
supply for Brazilian, Colombian, Mexican and Argentinian rates as a contraction 
of money supply relative to money demand raises the domestic interest rate. 
We only model Brazilian rates after the break date, as of June 1999. This last 
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domestic interest rates. They positively depend on the risk premium. A rise in 
country risk implies a rise in domestic interest rates as investors need to get a 
higher return for bearing the risk. Brazilian rates are also positively influenced 
by the domestic level of activity and negatively by the domestic money supply. 
Table 7 presents the determinants of domestic interest rate changes.
As indicated by the estimated error-correction models, in the short run, 
changes in both US and domestic variables are statistically significant in explaining 
changes in the control-countries’ rates. As in the case of hard-peg countries, we 
observe the impact of changes in the risk premium on the domestic interest rates 
for most countries, namely, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru. The adjustment 
coefficient is only 1% in the case of Peru, 5% for Brazil, Mexico and Colombia and 
is as high as 31% for floating Argentina and, finally, 36% for Venezuela. It takes 
more than 10 years for Peruvian interest rates to revert back to half the distance of 
their deviation to the long-run value while this same required time is a year and a 
half for Colombian interest rates and 7 months for Mexican rates. Half-lives are 
much smaller for the remaining three countries, 3.8 months in the case of Brazil, 
3.5 for Venezuela and, lastly, only slightly more than a month for Argentina. We 
can’t really draw any conclusion from the computation of half-life coefficients of 
hard-peg countries, on one hand, control countries on the other hand, regarding 
any possible larger temporary autonomy for the ones or the others.
Overall, within these eight countries, Brazil appears to be the only one to 
have true autonomy as its interest rate is only caused by internal factors. In all 
other countries, whatever the exchange rate regime, both domestic and foreign 
variables determine the local interest rates in the long and short run. To find out 
which variables have a significant impact on interest rates, we model shocks on the 
variables intervening in the long-term relations. Impulse response functions measure 
the effect of a one-standard-deviation change on the response variable, namely the 
domestic interest rates. Table 8 presents the residuals correlation matrices. 
In the case of Argentina restricted to the floating period, there is strong 
residuals correlation between the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate, 
between the domestic level of activity and the exchange rate and, finally, between 
the US money supply and the exchange rate. We model impulse responses with 
an alternative ordering of the variables when the ordering has an impact on 
responses, which is the case of Argentina. As far as Brazil is concerned, there is 
a relatively strong residuals correlation between the domestic money supply and 
the risk premium, while for Colombia and Mexico, correlation is high between 
the domestic interest rate and the domestic money supply. Finally, in the cases 
of both Peru and Venezuela, residuals correlations are quite small, meaning that 
shocks are likely to occur in isolation.
Figures  to 9 trace the current and future effects of a one-standard-
deviation change in each variable intervening in the long-run relation on the 
domestic interest rates in all six countries. The impulse responses are presented 
with a 95% confidence band. With the exception of Argentina, the modeling 
of alternative variables orderings has no significant impact on the responses of 
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FIGURE 
BRAZILIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON RISK PREMIUM, ON DOMESTIC INCOME
AND ON DOMESTIC MONEY SUPPLY
Source: Own estimation.112 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
In the case of Brazil, as shown in Figure , we first model a negative 
shock on the country’s investor confidence. It leads to a significant increase of 
the domestic interest rate. The response is significant after 6 months and during a 
year and is significant again after 21 months. We then model a positive domestic 
demand shock. It leads to a significant increase of the interest rate on the entire 
period. Finally, we model an expansive domestic monetary shock and find out 
that it has only a minor effect on the domestic interest rate. 
FIGURE 5
COLOMBIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON EXCHANGE RATE AND ON DOMESTIC MONEY SUPPLY
Source: Own estimation.
When we model impulse response functions for Colombia, presented 
in Figure 5, we find out that a depreciation leads to a decline of the interest 
rate as stated in the long-run relation. According to the currency-substitution 
phenomenon, an exchange rate depreciation generates a fall in money demand 
relative to money supply, leading to a temporary decline in the domestic interest 
rate. This decline is significant after 9 months while an expansive domestic 
monetary shock leads to an immediate fall of the domestic interest rate, significant 
on a 1 months period.
Figure 6 presents the case of Mexico. A restrictive US monetary policy 
shock and an expansive domestic monetary shock have no impact on the domestic 
interest rate whatever the ordering of the variables. A positive domestic demand 
shock induces an increase of the interest rate significant after 9 months and on 
the rest of the period while a positive shock on the US money supply leads to an 
increase in the interest rate, as stated in the long-run relation estimated as well as 
in the conceptual framework. This increase is significant after 10 months and on 
the rest of the period.
Figure 7 traces the effects of a US monetary policy shock and a US demand 
shock on the Peruvian interest rate. The restrictive US monetary shock leads to 
an increase of the Peruvian interest rate, significant on the second part of the 
observation period, while the shock in the external demand has no impact at all. Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 113
FIGURE 6
MEXICAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON US INTEREST RATE, ON DOMESTIC INCOME
AND ON DOMESTIC AND US MONEY SUPPLIES
Source: Own estimation.
FIGURE 7
PERUVIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON US INTEREST RATE AND ON US INCOME
Source: Own estimation.11 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
FIGURE 8
VENEZUELAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES
TO A SHOCK ON US INTEREST RATE, ON EXCHANGE RATE
AND ON US INCOME
Source: Own estimation.Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 115
In the case of Venezuela, presented in Figure 8, a restrictive US monetary 
policy shock leads to an immediate decline of the interest rate, which is opposite to 
the interest parity theory. Looking at the long-run determinants of the Venezuelan 
interest rate, we notice a positive relation with the US interest rate however, 
looking at the short-run determinants, we observe a negative impact of changes 
in the US interest rate. This impact is significant on the first 10 months of the 
observation period. A depreciation leads to an increase in the interest rate, as 
stated in the uncovered interest parity condition, however this increase shortly 
disappears. Finally, a positive US demand shock leads to a tiny decline of the 
domestic interest rate. 
FIGURE 9
ARGENTINIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES
TO A SHOCK ON EXCHANGE RATE, ON DOMESTIC INCOME
AND ON DOMESTIC AND US MONEY SUPPLIES
Source: Own estimation.
Finally, on Figure 9, we look at the behavior of Argentinian interest 
rates on the country’s floating rates period. A depreciation of the exchange rate 
leads to a tiny increase in the interest rate which disappears after  months. 
As by our conceptual framework, a positive shock on the domestic demand 
leads to an increase in the domestic interest rate, immediate and significant 116 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
on the entire period, while an expansive domestic monetary shock induces an 
immediate and significant decline of the interest rate. Finally, an expansive 
US monetary shock has no impact on the interest rate. We present in the 
Appendix, Figure A2, an alternative variables ordering as responses are then 
slightly different. Instead of a shock on the exchange rate happening first, we 
model the exchange rate disturbance as being the last shock. The interest rate 
response is then larger and significant on the 2 months period. As in the case 
of Venezuela, a depreciation leads to an increase in the interest rate, as stated 
in the uncovered interest parity condition. As far as the three other variables 
are concerned, we observe smaller interest rate responses following a positive 
domestic demand shock and following an expansive domestic monetary shock, 
however responses are still significant. Whatever the variables ordering, the 
US monetary shock has no impact at all. 
With the exception of Brazil, we observe an impact of both domestic and 
US factors in the determination of control-countries’ domestic interest rates 
looking at the long and short-run dynamics as well as looking at the impulse 
response functions. Domestic interest rates are not independent from what is 
happening in the United States. They are caused by both domestic and US 
variables. We conclude that the monetary policy of control countries does not 
exclusively pursue domestic aims, with the exception of the region’s largest 
country, Brazil, the only floating-rate-economy of our sample that proves to 
benefit from monetary autonomy. 
5.  Conclusions
We find empirical evidence that in Latin America the exchange rate 
regime does not rigidly determine the degree of monetary policy independence. 
Hard-peg countries enjoy some independence as their interest rates are mostly 
but not exclusively determined by US variables while, even perfectly-flexible 
rates may not guarantee monetary autonomy since the interest rates of our set 
of control-countries, with the exception of Brazil, are not only determined by 
internal factors but also by US variables. Unlike the traditional view, we conclude 
that economies with rigidly-fixed exchange rates do not bear a loss of monetary 
autonomy substantially higher than that of floating-exchange-rate economies. 
When currency substitution exists, even perfectly flexible rates may not guarantee 
monetary independence. As stated in the “fear of floating” literature, countries 
that are not pegging their currencies do often choose to follow the base interest 
rate to some degree, not because they cannot exert independence but because 
they simply choose not to do so. The potential instability of floating rates does 
not seem to be effectively compensated by any meaningful monetary freedom. 
In terms of policy implications and as explained by Canova (2005), it seems that 
Latin American policymakers are required to carefully monitor US conditions, 
whatever the exchange rate regime! Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 117
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Panama Description 6 month
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Source IFS IFS IFS JP Morgan CGRP
Ecuador Description Short-term
deposit rate































































































































































Source IFS IFS IFS IFS JP Morgan BCV
United-States Description Treasury
bill rate










Source IFS IFS IFS IFS
Source: Own estimation.
Notes: CPI: Consumer Prices Index;  N/A: not applicable;  IMAE: Índice Mensual de Actividad Económica; s.a.: seasonally adjusted; 
I.M.F. International Financial Statistics; CGRP: Contraloría General de la República de Panamá; BCRA: Banco Central de la República 
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FIGURE A1
ECUADORIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON DOMESTIC AND US MONEY SUPPLIES, ON US INTEREST RATE,
AND ON US INCOME
Source: Own estimation.Exchange Rate Regimes and Interest Rates in Latin America 123
FIGURE A2
ARGENTINIAN INTEREST RATE RESPONSES TO A SHOCK
ON DOMESTIC INCOME, ON DOMESTIC AND US MONEY SUPPLIES, 
AND ON EXCHANGE RATE
Source: Own estimation.12 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 7 (Mayo) 2010
TABLE A 
INTERVENTION VARIABLES DETAILS
Argentina During the currency board period, three outliers, March, July and August 
2001, coincide with the deep crisis and traumatic devaluation of the Peso 
the country went through.
Brazil A dummy is necessary in August 1999 as a consequence of the financial 
crisis and currency devaluation the country faced at the beginning of 
that same year. The outlier in February 2003 is supposedly linked with 
Argentina’s economic crisis.
Colombia Outliers in August, October and December 1999 can be attributed to the 
country’s move to a floating exchange rate regime in September 1999, after 
abandoning the crawling-peg band system introduced in 1992.
Ecuador There are outliers in September and October 2007 as president Correa is 
changing the country’s political landscape by rewriting the constitution. 
A dummy is necessary in November 2008, just before the president made 
good on months of threats by defaulting on a US$30 million coupon owed 
to Ecuador’s global ’12s, and on US$2.7 billion of global ’30s. 
Mexico Outliers are present in 1999, February, April and October. We suppose they 
are a consequence of the Brazilian crisis.
Peru There is an outlier in September 2001, just before the decision of the Central 
Bank to explicitly target a range for CPI inflation. The outliers in March and 
June 2008 are linked to the measures announced by the Central Bank in April 
2008, namely, an increase in the fee charged to foreigners on the purchase 
of “Certificates of Deposits” to 00 basis points and a hike in the marginal 
reserve requirement on PEN deposits by foreigners in local banks.
Venezuela We notice outliers in December 2001 and February 2002 as the country 
faces deep political troubles that have led to the “coup”, on the 11th of 
April, 2002. The dummy in December 2002 coincides with a 63-day strike 
the country faced. Strict capital controls have been in place since January 
2003 as authorities have reacted to intense pressure on the currency and 
bank deposits generated by capital flight.
Source: Author elaboration.